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ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: ITS PLACE IN
WASHINGTON LAW
DAVID WAYNE GITTINGER
Artificial insemination has found its place, or at least its beginning,
in American society.' It has not yet found its niche in American law.
This comment is an attempt to indicate and speculate just what that
niche would be under the present cases, statutes, and policies of the
Washington court and legislature.
Artificial insemination is the introduction of semen into the female
reproductive tract by mechanical means in order to effect pregnancy
without sexual intercourse. Artificial insemination can be either of two
types. Where the husband is fertile and the wife capable of bearing
children, but for some reason the act of sexual intercourse is impossible,
semen of the husband can be used to inseminate the wife. This method
is called homologous artificial insemination, or AIH, and poses no
significant legal problems.
Heterologous artificial insemination, or AID, is the method by which
the semen of a third party donor is used to inseminate the woman by
mechanical means. This practice gives rise to many legal complications.
The foremost of the legal problems growing out of AID is whether
or not a child born by this method is legitimate. A decision on this point
will have a profound effect on several fields of Washington law, ranging
from inheritance rights to child custody privileges. This problem is
dealt with in generalities only, as it is not the most pressing and imme-
diate legal questionmark arising out of this growing medical practice.
Much has been written on the issue of legitimacy.2
The Washington court, when faced squarely with the issue of legiti-
macy of a child conceived by AID, may very likely hold that the child
so conceived is the legitimate issue of lawful wedlock. Three possible
rationalizations, or any combination thereof, may underly such a deci-
sion. First, the Supreme Court of Washington, like all other state
courts, has repeatedly stated that when a legal marriage exists at the
time of conception or at the time of birth,' there is a strong presump-
lEstimates of the number of test tube offsprings in the United States today vary
from 20,000 to 100,000. Seymour and Koerner, Artificial Insemination, Present Status
in the United States as Shown by a Recent Survey, 116 J. Amer. Med. Assn. 2747
(1941) ; 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1016 (1955) ; 8 U. Fla. L. Rev. 304 (1955).
2 34 Can.B.R. 304 (1956) ; 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 659 (1956) ; 8 U. Fla. L. Rev. 304
(1955) ; 8 La. L. Rev. 484 (1948).
a This would seem to be the most common instance involving the use of AID.
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tion that the child born is the legitimate issue of lawful wedlock.' In-
deed this presumption is one of the strongest in American law. In a
recent case on the trial level in Illinois,' the court held this presumption
was not overcome by conflicting testimony to the effect that the child
was conceived by artificial insemination. Concededly this presumption
is only a presumption, and can be rebutted by evidence of non-access
or complete absence of the husband when the child must have been
begotten.' However, the very existence of such a presumption manifests
an intent, evidentiary wise and policy wise, to protect a child from
the brand of illegitimacy.
This presumption is not the only evidence of policy considerations
which may underly a finding that a child conceived by artificial in-
semination is legitimate. Statements to the effect that the welfare of
the children is the matter of primary concern appear repeatedly in the
reports of divorce cases, custody proceedings, and actions for mainte-
nance and support."
A third theory has been advanced by the New York Supreme Court.'
In the only case to reach appellate review in a state court which even
indirectly touches upon the question of artificial insemination, the
court held that a child conceived by AID had been "potentially adopted
or semi-adopted"' by the husband. Therefore the court decided that
the husband could not be deprived of his visitation rights on the basis
that he was not the biological father of the child. The opinion is flavored
with intimations that the child was legitimate, but legitimacy was
never directly in issue and the court did not decide the question. The
author believes, however, that this case further reflects an -underlying
policy of protecting the child. Whether or not the Washington court
would adopt a theory of semi-adoption is at least doubtful in view of
4 State v. Frenger, 158 Wash. 683, 291 Pac. 1089 (1930) ; Pierson v. Pierson, 124
Wash. 319, 214 Pac. 159 (1923).
G Ohlsen v. Ohlsen, Unreported, Super. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. (Nov. 1954), See
187 J. Amer. Med. Assn. 1639 (1955).
6 It should be noted that Washington does not follow Lord Mansfield's rule to the
effect that declarations of a father or mother cannot be admitted to bastardize the issue
born after marriage. It re the Adoption of a Minor, 29 Wn.2d 759, 189 P.2d 458
(1948) ; Pierson v. Pierson, supra note 4. See Schlemer, Artificial Insemination and
thc Law, 32 Mich. S.B.J. 44, 45 (No. 4, 1953).
7 Allen v. Allen, 38 Wn.2d 128, 228 P.2d 151 (1951) ; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wn.2d
159, 222 P.2d 400 (1950) ; Fleck v. Fleck, 31 Wn.2d 114, 195 P.2d 100 (1948).
8 Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
9 Supra note 8 at 391.
10 Supra note 8 at 392, where the court stated that if the wife was artificially insem-
inated with the consent of her husband, the child was not an illigitimate child. This was




the Washington court's adherence to the requirement of strict com-
pliance with the adoption statute."
Turning more specifically to the criminal and civil liabilities which
may attach to the parties participating in heterologous artificial insem-
ination, the speculations become a little less vague. Surprising results
could be reached under several Washington criminal statutes.
Adultery. Adultery is a statutory crime in Washington and carries
criminal penalties.' In the words of the statute, the crime is committed
when a married person engages in sexual intercourse with a person
other than his or her lawful spouse. When the requisite elements of
of the crime are established, both parties are guilty of the crime.
To decide that the legislature has prescribed the conduct in artificial
insemination as criminally adulterous would be difficult. As the statute
expressly requires sexual intercourse as an essential element of the
crime, the definition of that term would seem to be decisive. RCW
9.79.030 defines sexual intercourse by saying "any sexual penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to complete sexual intercourse." Does this
definition necessarily exclude by implication the sufficiency of any other
act as constituting sexual intercourse? Arguably the statute does not
import any such negative implication. This literal reading of the statute
could become important if the court decides that AID is contrary to a
strong public policy and searches for a statutory sanction to proscribe it.
Basically, the issue of criminal adultery hinges on a choice between
two conflicting theories pertaining to the definition and nature of
adultery. More specifically, the conflict revolves around the necessity
of sexual intercourse and its definition, if it is a necessary element."
One theory has found support in an English case,'" a Canadian case'5
and, by way of dictum, a United States state court decision." The theory
advanced by these cases is that the essence of adultery is the voluntary
surrender of the reproductive powers to a person other than the lawful
spouse, thereby introducing into the family a false strain of blood. This
theory of adultery does not necessitate any physical contact of the
male and female sex organs. The cases which have advanced this theory
". In re Hope's Adoption, 30 Wn2d 185, 191 P2d 289 (1948) ; In re Sipes, 24 Wn.2d
603, 167 P2d 139 (1946).
"2 RCW 9.79.110.
1s A most extensive discussion of these two theories can be found in 34 Can.B.R. 1
(1956).
14 Russell v. Russell, (1924) A.C. 689.
15 Orford v. Orford, see 49 Ont. L. Rev. 15.
"a Doornbos v. Doornbos, Unreported, Super. Ct. of Cook County, IIl. (1954) ; see
8 U. Fla. L. Rev. 304 (1955); 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1016 (1955).
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were not criminal prosecutions for adultery, but divorce and custody
suits. It is the author's view that while adultery as grounds for divorce7
could arguably be defined as not requiring physical contact of the sex
organs but only a surrender of the reproductive organs by AID, a
criminal prosecution could not rest on that basis. Adultery as grounds
for divorce is based on a violation of the exclusive right to sexual inter-
course between the marital partners. Adultery is a violation of that
right. Criminal adultery, by way of contrast, is punishable because it
offends society, and shocks morality." What is punished criminally is
the sexual gratification and satisfaction of lust of engaging in extra-
marital intercourse, not the surrender of reproductive organs." Artifi-
cial insemination is not such a sexual gratification, and hence, in the
writer's view, not criminal adultery."
Fornication. The crime of fornication is actionable at common
law, and common law crimes are actionable in Washington.2 There is
no statute defining the crime and the author is aware of no criminal
prosecution for fornication in this jurisdiction. Several states which
have prosecuted criminally have interpreted the common law definition
with varying results with respect to the necessary marital status of
the actors.22 One common element of each interpretation is sexual inter-
course, and more often than not, the woman engaging in sexual inter-
course must be unmarried." Although incidents of unmarried women
seeking AID are not unheard of,2 ' the hurdle of finding the requisite
sexual intercourse would face the court, and the same argument against
an affirmative finding in a prosecution for adultery would be applicable
in a prosecution for fornication.
Lewdness. Lewdness in Washington is a gross misdemeanor.25
Either lewd and open cohabitation, open and gross lewdness, or expo-
sure is the essential element. Sexual intercourse is commonly present
but it is not required. In essence, lewdness is a form of immorality which
offends the community morals2" or has relation to sexual impurity.'
17 Adultery is a grounds for divorce under RCW 26.08.020.
18 See note 13, supra.
10 See note 13, supra.
20 The conduct could not conceivably be adulterous between the woman and the
doctor if the latter was a woman.
21 RCW 9.01.150.
22 139 Am. St. Rep. 365.
23 37 C.J.S., Fornication § 1 (1943).
24 See note 13, mspra.
25 RCW 9.79.120.
26 Abbott v. State, 163 Tenn. 384, 43 S.W.2d 211 (1931).
27 U.S. v. Males, 51 Fed. 41 (DC Ind. 1892).
1957]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
AID may or may not satisfy the requirements of open and gross lewd-
ness so as to subject the participants to criminal prosecution. The
practice of artificial insemination is generally clothed in secrecy as
much as possible. Only the doctor knows the identity of the donor and
donee in a particular case. The donor and donee remain anonymous
to each other. This fact alone would seem to negative any finding of
"open and gross" lewdness, even if AID were held to be a form of im-
morality offending the community morals or having relation to sexual
impurity. However, if the practice of artificial insemination increases in
the medical world and medical science strives to perfect that practice,
extensive records and investigations may be necessary. With records
and investigations come publicity, and this publicity may satisfy the
requirement of openness. This could conceivably lead to a criminal
prosecution of the participants if AID, after attaining greater notoriety,
remains socially unacceptable. This form of criminal prosecution
remains as a very real source of danger to the participants in artificial
insemination.
AID As a Crime. There is no modern authority on which to base
a speculation as to the legality of AID itself. In 1883, a French court
held a doctor who administered artificial insemination guilty of un-
lawful conduct. The rationale of the holding is not clear. One writer
has suggested that the personality of the doctor was the decisive
factor.2"
Plainly, if the woman who procures artificial insemination is guilty
of criminal adultery or fornication, either the doctor or the donor, or
both, could be prosecuted as a principal and be equally punishable.29
Forgery and Vital Statistics. Two very probable sources of criminal
liability which could attach to all participants in AID arise from the
statutory crime of forgery"0 and the statute requiring the filing of in-
formation concerning births.31 It is not necessary to discuss the refine-
ments of each statute. Basically, falsification of public records under-
lies a prosecution in each instance.
Attending physicians at birth are required to supply the pertinent
information to the registrar, including the name of the father if known.
28 Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 La. L. Rev. 484
(1948).
29 RCW 9.01.030 defines a principal as one who is directly or indirectly concerned,
or who aids or abets, in the commission of a crime.
so RCW 9.44.040 (2) defines second degree forgery, in part, as the making of any




If the doctor who administered artificial insemination knowingly names
the husband as the father, he is in violation of both statutes.
Where, in order to avoid liability, one physician performs the in-
semination and another, who does not know that the insemination was
artificial, attends at birth, the latter would not become liable. If, how-
ever, the husband and wife represent that the husband is the father of
the child, or if they register the child themselves as their own natural
issue,32 they may be subject to prosecution under both statutes. The
problem is illustrative only, and the analysis is not meant to be detailed.
It indicates another source of criminal liability that faces the woman
inseminated, her husband, and physicians that become involved in AID.
Prohibited Marriages and Incest. The possibility of criminal lia-
bility can be extended another step and present an unjustifiable hazard
to the children born of artificial insemination. At the present time the
supply of donors is limited. This inadequacy stems from the time-
consuming search by physicians for nearly perfect males having mental
and physical characteristics matching those of the husband. After a
near-perfect match is found, the selected prospective donor often re-
fuses because of his moral, religious, and social convictions. The short-
age necessitates the repeated use of one donor in several different insem-
inations. As a result, more than one offspring may be born of the same
biological parent. Assuming the physician administering AID has a
stable group of patients drawn from one geographical area or social
level, multiplication of the number of donees to each donor creates a
potent possibility of intermarriage of half brother and half sister. The
result is a prohibited marriage under RCW 28.04.020.8 The physical
incidents of this marriage would be subject to additional criminal pun-
ishment. The Washington incest statute" makes criminal the act of
sexual intercourse between any male and female closer of kin than
second cousins. The prohibited marriage does not bar such a prosecu-
tion," and knowledge of the blood relationship is not an essential ele-
ment of the crime."
Blackmail. The patent defect in these analyses lies in the fact that a
32 RCW 70.58.080 requires the mother and father to file the pertinent information if
no physician or mid-wife attends at birth.
Z; RCW 26.04.020 provides in part that a marriage is prohibited "when the parties
thereto are nearer of kin to each other than second cousins, whether of the whole or
half blood . . :
34 RCW 9.79.090.
35 State v. Nakashima, 62 Wash. 686, 114 Pac. 894 (1911).
86 State v. Glindemann, 34 Wash. 221, 75 Pac. 800 (1904), where the court held
that knowledge, as an essential element, was not necessary to satisfy due process.
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veil of secrecy usually surrounds the practice of AID. As a practical
matter, the facts most often remain unknown to the prosecutor. This
secrecy, however, does not preclude awareness on the donor's part that
if his participation in AID has been successful, he is the biological
father of a child born of a woman not his spouse. If by chance his donee
becomes known to him, he may claim custody rights to the childI or a
right of inheritance if the child dies. In lieu of such a claim, or if AID
and a child born thereof carry an undesirable social stigma, the donor
might attempt to blackmail the child, the mother, or the mother's hus-
band by threatening to reveal the truth concerning the child's origin.
These acts by an unscrupulous donor would be punishable under the
Washington blackmail statute. 8
The possibilities of criminal punishment of participants in AID as
here set forth are illustrative only and not meant to be exhaustive. They
do indicate, however, that the impact of artificial insemination upon
criminal concepts should be realized with a view towards meeting the
problems before they arise.
Bastardy. In the area of quasi-criminal liability, the donor and
doctor engaging in AID encounter a possible source of trouble under
the Washington filiation statute.3 9 It provides in part,
When an unmarried woman is pregnant or has been delivered of a child
not the issue of lawful wedlock, she or her parents or guardian may file
a verified complaint with a justice of the peace accusing some person of
being the father of her child or being responsible for her condition.
This statute would seem applicable to the case where divorce follows
conception by AID but precedes the birth of the child. Arguably the
child conceived by artificial insemination is not the issue of lawful
wedlock. The donor is the biological father of the child, and, in that
sense, is responsible for the woman's condition. It also could be held
that the doctor is responsible for her condition. He has provided the
mechanical means which have resulted in the condition of pregnancy.
Either finding might provide the basis for an action for payment of the
expenses of child birth, the costs of the suit, and maintenance of the
child until it reached the age of sixteen. Failure to comply with the
order to pay would be subject to severe criminal penalties. 0 The
problem of liability in this area is very real. The filiation statute does
-
7 Fitzgerald v. Leuthold, 30 Wn2d 402, 192 P.2d 371 (1948).
38 RCW 9.33.050.
39 RCW 2624.010.4o RCW 26.24.100.
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not expressly require sexual intercourse. In an action based on this
statute, as contrasted to a prosecution for criminal adultery, the court
would not be faced with the problem of defining that term.
The area of civil liability presents further problems and legal com-
plications which may result in liability for the participants in artificial
insemination. The following problems are those which the author feels
are most worthy of comment and most indicative of the fact that AID
has not yet found its place in Washington jurisprudence.
Alienation of Affections. The husband of the artifically inseminated
woman may have a cause of action against the donor and doctor for
the alienation of his wife's affections. This tort is actionable in Wash-
ington and does not require sexual intercourse. 1 In Lankford v. Tom-
bari,'2 the court said that the intent to alienate the wife's affections was
a requisite, but that it could be inferred from the seductive acts. If
AID qualifies as a seductive act, the fact of conception from the donor's
semen and the mechanics aiding conception furnished by the doctor
may be sufficient to support an inference that the requisite intent was
present. Two obstacles stand in the way of a successful suit. First, the
husband would have to show that his wife's affections were in fact
alienated. This would be difficult in many instances. Ordinarily, and
without debating the point, a child would have the effect of tying the
childless marriage more closely together. Secondly, the husband may
be estopped by his consent to the operation, and this consent is normally
required by doctors. The latter of these obstacles may not exist, how-
ever, if the practice of AID is deemed unlawful and the consent in-
operative.
Criminal Conversation. The husband of the woman inseminated
may have a cause of action against the donor for criminal conversation.
The Washington cases to date have all involved actual sexual inter-
course.'3 If sexual intercourse is a requisite of the tort of criminal con-
versation, liability of the doctor and donor would depend on the court's
interpretation of that term, and whether or not AID falls within that
definition. If the court is ready to adopt the theory advanced by the
Canadian and English cases," liability of the donor and doctor could
be predicated upon use of the reproductive organs of the husband's
41 Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn2d 412, 213 P2d 627 (1950) ; Kenworthy v. Rich-
mond, 95 Wash. 407, 163 Pac. 924 (1917).
42 See note 41, supra.
43 Bernier v. Kochopulos, 37 Wn2d 305, 223 P.2d 205 (1950).
"4 See note 13, supra.
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wife. Consent to AID by the husband may work an estoppel unless it
is found inoperative.
Legitimation. Recognition of paternity by the donor could lead to
serious legal complications under the Washington probate code." The
code provides that if a person acknowledges that he is the father of an
illegitimate child, that child shall inherit from the father as if it were
of legitimate birth. Liability under this statute is based on the premise,
of course, that the court holds the child born of AID to be illegitimate.
Acknowledgement by the father must be by a written statement, signed
in the presence of a competent witness.4" The statement does not have
to be made with the intent to legitimize the child, and it can be found
in a variety of documents.4 It is apparent that if a donor consents to
adoption of the child by a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute, he
may have legitimized the child unwittingly for purposes of inheritance.
The adoption of the child by the donee and her husband would not
terminate the child's rights of inheritance from the donor. An adopted
child inherits from both his natural and adoptive parents." If the
donor later makes a will and neglects to expressly disinherit the child,
or if he dies intestate, the child may claim an intestate share of the
donor's estate."
Sales Warranty. Both the doctor and donor may incur civil liability
for breach of implied warranties under the sales act."0 While a physi-
cian may not be commonly thought of as a vendor under this statute,
there may be an implied warranty on his part that the semen is fit for
the purpose for which it is to be used. There could be no question that
the physician knows the purpose. Plainly the wife and husband rely
on his judgment. Damages for a breach of this warranty would be
measured by the natural consequences flowing from the breach. A
verdict could reach enormous proportions.
There is a body of related cases from which analogies can be drawn.
In several instances patients have been given blood transfusions which
resulted in death or serious relapses because of a mismatching of blood
types. In actions against the hospitals by the injured patient or his
personal representative for negligence and breach of implied warranties,
45 RCW, Title 11.
46 RCW 11.04.080 (An amendment to this section providing that any acknowledg-
ment, written or oral, would be sufficient to establish the child's right to inherit was
indefinitely postponed by the 1957 legislature. H.B. 126 and 214.).
47 In re Beekman's Estate, 160 Wash. 669, 295 Pac. 942 (1931); In re Rohrer, 22
Wash. 151, 60 Pac. 122, 50 L.R.A. 350 (1900).4 8 In re Roderick's Estate, 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325 (1930).
40 RCW 11.12.090.
50 RCW 63.04.150, 160.
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the courts have decided that the hospital was not a seller within the
terms of the sales act. In Gile v. Kennewick Hospital Dist.,"' the Wash-
ington court held that the transfer of blood was not a sale to which a
warranty attached, but only a transfer incidental to services rendered.
The court quoted the following from a leading New York case involving
similar facts:
It has long been recognized that, when service predominates, and trans-
fer of personal property is but an incidental feature of the transaction,
the transaction is not deemed a sale within the sales act. 2
The author believes that these cases are not decisive of the issue as
applied to artificial insemination. In the Gile case, the blood transfu-
sion was in fact but an incidental part of the services rendered." In
the case of AID, the service performed centers around the transfer of
semen to the donee. The operation is quite simple and quickly per-
formed." Services do not predominate to such a great extent, if at all.
Another factor detracts from the analogy between the blood donation
cases and artificial insemination. Blood transfusions are recognized
socially as well as medically. Public policy encourages blood donations
and blood banks. Public policy, at the present time, does not look
favorably upon the donation and transfer of human semen.
Summarily disposing of any privity problems, a similar warranty
theory could be the basis of an action against the donor if a defective
child is born or other ill effects resulting from the insemination are
traceable to his semen. In at least one aspect, the argument against the
donor is stronger than against the doctor in that the donor performs no
services aside from making available a substance to be transferred for
a particular purpose. The argument is detracted from by the fact that
the woman does not rely on the donor, but rather the doctor, in selecting
the source of semen to be used.
Fraud, Misrepresentation, and Negligence. The possibility of tort
actions against the donor and doctor in this area are almost unlimited.
It is not necessary to evaluate each possible cause of action to illustrate
that the problem exists. Basically, the determinative fact in each case
will be the standard of care placed on respective parties to AID in
their dealings with each other.
r, 48 Wn.2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956).
5" Permutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1954).
6 The reported facts indicate that the blood transfusion was a routine surgical serv-
ice, and that the patient was undergoing a major knee operation.
54 Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 La. L. Rev. 484(1948).
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There seems to be no reason for supposing that a physician will not
be required to exercise the same degree of care and honesty in insemi-
nating a woman artificially as he is required to exercise in any other
treatment. If he fails to exercise due care he will be liable for damages
in the same manner as he would for any other professional negligence.
Just how much research into the medical history of the mother and
donor will be necessary to meet that standard, and just how careful he
must be in obtaining semen from the donor," is not subject to an
arbitrary limitation. This must be left for court decisions.
The duties of the donor in this area should be no different from those
imposed on similar dealings in other contexts. Certainly he may be
subject to a damage action sounding in negligence for failure to disclose
facts about his medical history or his capabilities as a donor which he
should have known. Similarly, he could be held liable for fraud and
misrepresentation if he deliberately conceals information pertinent to
his selection as a donor.
. CONCLUSION
The author's conclusion, like his analysis, is speculative. The most
that can be said is that a solution to the problems raised by AID does
not seem readily available except through legislation.5" Just what form
that legislation should take is similarly speculative. If a particular
legislature is unreceptive to AID, on policy grounds, it may consider
making AID itself criminally punishable. In the author's view, this
does not provide a satisfactory answer to an undesirable problem. Such
legislation may very well have the effect of taking AID out of the hands
of reputable physicians and concealing it, much like the practice of
abortions as it exists today.
If Washington is more responsive to the practice of AID, legislation
should take the form of regulation and control as opposed to absolute
proscription. W~iters have proposed forms which this regulatory legis-
lation should take,"' and no purpose would be served by repeating
them here. It should be noted in this connection that governmental
regulation will mean an end to most of the secrecy which cloaks the
practice of artificial insemination at the present time. If this secrecy
is still desirable socially, regulatory measures would not seem to be a
completely satisfactory answer.
55 To assure complete secrecy of identity of donee and donor to each other, it has
been suggested that the semen only should be brought to the clinic or office where the
insemination is to take place.
58 Legislation has been proposed in six states. For a discussion of these proposals,
see 8 U. Fla. L. Rev. 304, 313 (1955).
ST See note 56, supra.
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